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RECENT DECISIONS
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-ALIENs-PoWllR TO ExCLuDE AND DENY HEARINoIn two similar cases, petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus from federal
district courts in order to obtain release from federal immigration authorities.
Both were aliens who had been lawful permanent residents at the time they left
the country. Mezei had allegedly gone abroad to visit his dying mother, and his
return to the United States had been delayed by difficulty in securing an exit
permit. Kwong Hai Chew had left the country to sail aboard a vessel of American
registry, prior to which he had been screened by the United States Coast Guard.
He had also served in the United States Merchant Marine with credit during
World War II. On return to the United States, both petitioners were 'denied
entry without a hearing, "on the basis of information of a confidential nature,
the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest." This action
was taken pursuant to federal regulations duly prescribed.1 In the Kwong case,
the district court denied the writ on the ground that, since every entry by an
alien is to be deemed a new entry, the petitioner became subject to the exclusion
provisions of the immigration laws.2 In the Mezei case, the district court granted
the petition and authorized temporary admission after refusal of the federal
authorities to disclose in camera any proof of the petitioner's danger to the public
safety, since the petitioner had already been held for 21 months and the government conceded that, despite every effort on both its part and on that of the
petitioner, his entry into another country could not be secured.3 The decisions
of the district courts were affirmed by the respective courts of appeals.4 On

1 8 C.F.R., §175.53 and §175.57 (1949). The regulations are based on 40 Stat. L.
559 (1918), as amended by 55 Stat. L. 252 (1941), 22 U.S.C. (1946) §223. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 continues the provision. 66 Stat. L. 190 (1952), 8
U.S.C.A. (1953 Supp.) §1185. It also expressly provides that the attorney general may
deny a hearing if he is satisfied that the alien is excludable on certain grounds, on the basis
of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which the attorney general, m the
exercise of his discretion and after consultation with the appropriate security agencies, concludes would be prejudicial to the public mterest. 66 Stat. L. 199 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A.
(1953 Supp.) §l225(c). The exclusion of the petitioners did not come under the new
act because of the saving clause m §405(a). See 66 Stat. L. 280 (1952).
2 United States ex rel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 97 F. Supp.
592.
s United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 66.
The district court held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies even to
aliens on Ellis Island, and that, m the absence of facts showing that the detention was
reasonable, it must be considered unreasonable. The immigration authorities refused to show
facts which would prove the detention reasonable.
4 United States ex rel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, (2d Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d)
1009. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, (2d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 964. The
majority of the court of appeals m the Mezei case affirmed the admission but directed
reconsideration of the terms of the parole, smce they deemed the terms imposed by the
district court as creating too much hardship. Judge Learned Hand dissented m the
Mezei case on the ground that no constitutional question was mvolved, since an alien
could not force the United States to admit him even qualifiedly.

1232

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 51

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 5 held, both decisions reversed.
Since he had been on a vessel of American registry, Kwong Hai Chew had
not lost his status as a lawful permanent resident. The regulations under which
he had been denied entry without a hearing were construed not to apply to
lawful permanent residents, both on constitutional grounds and on the ground
of statutory intent. Mezei, on the other hand, could no longer be considered
as a lawful permanent resident, and since he thus became an alien seeking entry,
he had no right to a hearing on the question of his exclusion, even though he was
undeportable; he could be detained indefinitely if his removal could not be
effected. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct.
625 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 73 S.Ct 472 (1953).
These two cases draw a distinction between an alien seeking to enter who is
still to be deemed a lawful permanent resident and one who, though formerly
a lawful permanent resident, has lost that status by reason of his remaining
abroad for a certain length of time. The category into which the alien falls is
determined by reference to naturalization law, which defines the circumstances
under which continuity of residence is broken. An alien who is no longer in
t4e category of a lawful permanent resident is not entitled to the constitutional
protection of the due process clause. This holding is based upon the power of
Congress to provide that once an alien has departed and remained abroad for a
certain length of time, his re-entry is to be determined as if he were an alien
entering for the first time. He is then subject to the existing requirements for
entry.6 In the case of the alien who is not a lawful permanent resident, the action
of the executive department is final and not subject to judicial review when
Congress has not provided for it, since exclusion of aliens is an inherent executive
function in the conduct of foreign affairs. The rule of Knauff -v. Sh~ughnessy,1
in which the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion without hearing of an alien
who had never been a lawful permanent resident, has thus been extended to
cover an alien whom Congress has impliedly declared is no longer a lawful
permanent resident; but the alien whom Congress has impliedly declared to be
still a lawful permanent resident is entitled to the protection of the due process
clause and therefore to a hearing. Justice Clark's opinion for the majority in
the Mezei case does not explain why a hearing should be denied when the
exercise of the power to exclude necessarily results in indefinite detention

5 United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, cert. granted 344 U.S. 809, 73 S.Ct. 25
(1952); United States ex rel. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, cert. granted 343 U.S. 933,
72 S.Ct. 769 (1952).
6 United States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279, 52 S.Ct. 143 (1932);
United States ex rel. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129, 53 S.Ct. 40 (1932); The Chinese
Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S.Ct. 623 (1889).
7 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950). The Supreme Court sustained the same regulations involved in the principal case against the contentions that it violated due process of
law, constituted an unreasonable delegation of power by Congress to the President, and
that it was inapplicable to persons entering under the War Brides Act. Justices Frankfurter,
Jackson, and Black dissented as to the holding that the procedure was applicable to persons
entering under the War Brides Act.
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especially when the loss of status by the alien was involuntary.8 The dissenters
in the Mezei case recognize the right of an alien to a hearing when his removal
cannot be effected, but they do not recognize the constitutional limitation implicit
in the Kwong case on the power of Congress to change the status of the lawful
permanent resident into that of an alien entering for the first time. Justice
Black's dissent, in which Justice Douglas concurred, was based on the belief that
the petitioner had a constitutional right to a hearing in open court, and that
there was substantial danger to our democratic society when one man held an
unchecked power over the liberty of another. Justice Jackson's dissent, in which
Justice Frankfurter joined, stated that although detention of an alien might be
consistent with due process of law, nevertheless, failure to grant the alien a
hearing when his removal could not be effected was not. Justice Minton
dissented from the decision in the Kwong case without opinion.
The implication of the Kwong case is that Congress may not arbitrarily
convert a lawful permanent resident into an entering alien, and thereby take
away constitutional rights. But Congress is not acting arbitrarily in providing
for a change of status after an alien had been abroad for 19 months, thereby
placing him in a category in which he is denied constitutional rights.9 However,
the limitation on Congress which the Kwong case imports portends a holding
that section 235(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 195210 is unconstitutional. That section incorporated the regulation which was involved in
both the principal cases, declaring that the attorney general may exclude an
entering alien without a hearing "on the basis of information of a confidential
nature, the disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest."
Since section 101(13) expressly defines entry to include lawful permanent
residents,11 it would seem that section 235(c) is unconstitutional at least in
part. The limitation on Congress is not yet defined, but it would, it seems,
prevent arbitrary change of classification which will deny a hearing to a person
whom the Court believes should still be considered a lawful permanent resident.
It is submitted that there are two weaknesses in the decisions in the principal
cases. In the first place, the reasoning of neither gives Congress any explanation
of the limitations on its action; in the second place, if there is a fundamental
policy with respect to giving one alien who leaves this country a hearing on his
exclusion, then there is the same fundamental policy with respect to giving
another alien who has left this country a hearing on his exclusion. Aliens who
are permitted by the government to go abroad temporarily should at least have
the security of knowing that on their return, if they are excluded, they will know
why and have a chance to challenge the exclusion.
Lois H. Hambro, S.Ed.
8 Congress recognized the problem of the undeportable alien in considering changes in
the immigration laws, but it felt that it would be dangerous to permit their parole. See
S. Rep. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 637-639, 643-644 (1950).
9 In the Mezei case, the petitioner had been abroad for 19 months.
10 66 Stat. L. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. (1953 Supp.) §1225.
1166 Stat. L. 166 (1952) 8 U.S.C.A. (1953 Supp.) §1101.

